Fig. 1. Portuguese church, Ainaro.

Fig. 2. Portuguese era primary school, Venilale, 1933.
In 2005, twenty-five years after independence, the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu issued its first comprehensive high-school history curriculum. According to its authors, resources and capacity were not the only factors in the delay. Writing a national history curriculum after colonialism proved to be an inherently difficult negotiation in a community divided between Anglophone and Francophone communities, with an intricate and complex legacy of resistance and accommodation so close in the past.¹

For East Timor, emerging from two consecutive colonial eras, these challenges are profound. East Timor became the newest member of the UN upon full independence in 2002, following more than 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule ending in 1975, and a twenty-four year struggle

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Fig. 3. Portuguese era municipal market, Baucau.
against Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999. This paper examines the way particular narratives of national history are being employed in post-independence politics, and some of the challenges facing history-curriculum developers in East Timor. It is argued that beneath a broadly unifying and popular theme of national resistance to colonial occupations lies a more complex and ongoing struggle over the ownership of core historical narratives, post-colonial cultural affiliations, and national identity.

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND NATIONALIST STRUGGLE

As the future foreign minister and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Jose Ramos-Horta noted in 1996, ‘East Timor is at the crossroads of three major cultures: Melanesian, which binds us to our brothers and sisters of the South Pacific region; Malay-Polynesian binding us to South East Asia, and the Latin Catholic influence, a legacy of almost 500 years of Portuguese colonization’. These influences have offered disparate resources for competing colonial, neo-colonial and nationalist accounts of East Timorese history and identity.

During the twenty-four year Indonesian occupation, this tension became a site of symbolic struggle; with Indonesian neocolonial historiography emphasizing historical Malay connections, and East Timorese nationalists highlighting Melanesian affinities and the 450-year impact of Portuguese colonialism, by which East Timor could be identified as a nation distinct from Dutch-colonized west Timor. Examples of this contest during the occupation included the Indonesian claim that Tetum – the lingua franca of East Timor – was a ‘primitive’ or ‘corrupted’ form of Malay. Or similarly, that the Eastern archipelago islands, as the extreme limits of Hindu and later Arab trading networks, were part of a historical Javanese empire.

Less tendentiously, Indonesian historiography also tended to emphasize the indigenous pre-colonial unities of east and west Timor, while simultaneously eliding the fact that West Timor’s incorporation within the successor state of Indonesia was itself a product of little more than Dutch colonial boundaries. Dismissing the subsequent impact of 450 years of Portuguese colonialism on East Timorese society, Indonesian historiography treated anti-Portuguese sentiment as simply consonant with the archipelago-wide struggles against the Dutch, anomalously subsuming them, as Gunn notes, under the purview of a general anti-Dutch narrative. Thus, for example, the 1959 Viqueque uprising against Portuguese authority (a localized rebellion in which, ironically, separatist Indonesian refugees from the failed Permesta eastern islands rebellion against Jakarta played a catalysing role) was treated as an early movement for integration with Indonesia. These ‘return to the fatherland’ discourses reached their apogee in one text version of the Indonesian-orchestrated Balibo declaration in 1975, which spoke...
of a ‘400-year separation’ from Indonesia. These various claims sought to give historical legitimation to forced integration of the former Portuguese colony in 1976.

Predating the tumultuous events of 1975, Portuguese colonial historiography emphasized positive relations with the mother country and the progress of ‘Portugalização’ (‘Portugalization’) – a colonial metaphor for a ‘civilizing’ mission through the spread of Catholicism and the ‘pacification’ of periodic rebellions. The classic text *Timor na Historia de Portugal* (1951) which offered the archetypal ‘Portugalized perspective’ would now be an interesting footnote if it were not still being used in lesson preparation by some history teachers, owing to the absence of viable alternative resources.

Towards the end of the Portuguese colonial era, a seminary-educated assimilado (assimilated) elite began to enunciate a coherent nationalist historiography which drew inspiration from the regular ‘independence wars’ throughout the early colonial era which culminated in the Boaventura rebellion of 1912. For one nationalist author, this period was followed by the ‘passive resistance’ of Timorese in the twentieth century as Portuguese colonialism extended the reach of its economic and military control, issuing in the birth of modern nationalist sentiment in the Viqueque uprising of 1959. Throughout the Indonesian occupation, Timorese nationalists in the diaspora continued to emphasize the close historical and cultural ties with Melanesia, and the impact of Portuguese colonialism. As Jose Ramos-Horta put it, ‘If you take away Portuguese language and religion, there is no such thing as East Timor’.

East Timorese nationalist historiography, as Gunn notes, is distinctive in developing almost exclusively outside state sponsorship, among diaspora intellectuals. For East Timorese nationalists, the dominant historical narrative of East Timorese nationalism is the 500-year history of funu, or struggle, against Portuguese and Indonesian occupations. The Minister for Education, Armindo Maia, expresses this dominant nationalist narrative succinctly:

> We have a common history of resistance; first against the Portuguese. There’s a long list in history of rebellions against the Portuguese. Then we have the history of resistance against the Indonesians. This unifies us. And I hope it will cement our determination to fight for a better future, to fight for a better life and society. There is broad support for this simple version, or notion of funu... 

This narrative has its proto-nationalist heroes, in particular, Dom Boaventura, the figurehead of the 1912 rebellion against the Portuguese in Manufahi, and its modern resistance leaders in Nicholau Lobato, current President Xanana Gusmão and others. The articulation of a postcolonial ‘indigenous’ national identity, and a nationalist history was closely
Fig. 4. Monument to the victims of the Suai massacre in 1999.

Fig. 5. Villagers show hiding place near Venilale used by FALINTIL (Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor) during the Indonesian Occupation.
associated with the emergence of FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) in 1974. Working through local newspapers in the late colonial period, and through mass literacy and political education campaigns in the early years of the resistance, FRETILIN and its precursor groups were chiefly responsible for articulating the dominant themes of modern East Timorese nationalism.\(^{13}\) With its key actors, symbols and affiliations ‘valorized’ in the 2002 constitution, nationalist historiography now enjoys official status.\(^{14}\) Behind this broad and dominant narrative, which enjoys great popular support, a more complex set of legacies, borne of consecutive colonial eras, plays out in post-independence tensions over history and identity.\(^{15}\) The need for a new school history curriculum brings some of these complexities into relief.

**INDONESIAN CURRICULUM**

Following independence, the Indonesian school curriculum has remained the default, or ‘transitional’, syllabus throughout the lengthy process of national curriculum redevelopment. For obvious reasons, however, certain elements had to be dropped immediately after the Indonesian departure in 1999. Specifically, Panca Sila or Indonesian ideology and most of the history curriculum were abandoned. In the absence of a replacement curriculum, history teaching has been handled in an *ad hoc* fashion at the school level, with minimal guidance from the Ministry of Education, particularly at secondary-school level.\(^{16}\) Thus, history teaching in East Timor is presently decentralized, and largely dependent on individual teachers or schools.

During the occupation, the majority of school history classes focused on ‘History of Struggle of Indonesia’. The small amount of time devoted to East Timorese history essentially recounted the revisionist Indonesian integration story, focusing on the stage-managed processes of integration which resulted in East Timor becoming the twenty-sixth province of Indonesia in 1976.\(^{17}\) Little mention was made of the resistance campaign being waged by FRETILIN, and later, by the CNRT (National Council for the Timorese Resistance), other than to deride the former as a small number of disgruntled ‘communists’ who had committed atrocities in the civil war which preceded the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. As one East Timorese teacher recalls,

\[\ldots\] they talked about how East Timor wanted integration at Balibo, about the thirty-seven East Timorese representatives who requested integration, and the invading military in 1975, which they referred to as ‘volunteers’ or ‘partisans’. They talked about all the good things Indonesian had done for East Timor, they never mentioned human-rights violations or the killings…\(^{18}\)
Fig. 6. Indonesian Integration Monument, Dili, depicting a traditional Timorese warrior breaking loose from the chains of Portuguese colonialism.
After the fall of Suharto in 1998, some more critical commentary was evident in the curriculum, reflecting a wider effort to review the history curriculum in the wake of the New Order regime. These small revisionist efforts during the subsequent era of Indonesian President Habibie acknowledged ‘differences’ over integration of East Timor, but avoided mention of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, and continued to eschew a language of invasion in favour of a peaceful integration narrative.

CHALLENGES FOR HISTORY CURRICULUM DEVELOPERS

There are numerous practical challenges facing the development of a history curriculum. These primarily concern resources and, to a lesser degree, some issues over language policy. Key problems include a lack of suitable textbooks, resources, curriculum and lesson plans, and – in the lower grades – a disjunction between home and school language environments when Portuguese is the medium of instruction. As the example of Vanuatu shows, these practical issues can be addressed through a combination of external funding for curriculum development, local participation in the process, and the assistance of the former colonial government in translating textbooks for multi-language environments. While these problems pose grave short to mid-term challenges, there are broader post-independence tensions over history which may have more significance in the long term. These include post-colonial debates over history and identity, intergenerational tensions over Timorese historiography and the difficult cultural legacies of Portuguese and Indonesian rule. To understand these, it is useful to examine the two ‘official’ conceptions of national identity, memory and history embedded in the 2002 East Timorese constitution.

TWO ‘OFFICIAL’ NARRATIVES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND HISTORY

After a twenty-four year struggle for independence, the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor may be seen as a seminal ‘official’ declaration in a broader contest over national identity, national history, and cultural affiliations. While this process is often metaphorically understood as one of ‘imagining’ a nation, in practice it often involves the universalization of cultural and political values of a dominant nationalist grouping. In this regard, the new constitution embodies the core values and affinities of FRETILIN in general, and of an older generation of Portuguese-speaking nationalists and resistance leaders in particular. Two defining ‘official’ conceptions of national identity stand out in the constitution.
At the symbolic heart of the 2002 constitution, the ‘valorization of resistance’ clause remembers the long and traumatic struggle for national liberation. Section 11.1 embeds this ‘official’ conception of East Timorese national identity and history in the founding document of the state, declaring:

The Democratic Republic of East Timor acknowledges and values the secular resistance of the Maubere people against foreign domination and the contribution of all those who fought for national independence.

The collective term Maubere is a left populist term employed to represent the common people of Timor, a reversal of a word that was once a term of contempt for backward, illiterate and poor mountain people under Portuguese rule. As Joliffe notes, it was FRETILIN that turned the connotation of Maubere, a common Timorese name, on its head, making it a populist catch cry and term of national pride. Indeed, FRETILIN considered it so fundamental a part of its identity that objections were lodged with the UN electoral commission over its use in the registered name of another party, arguing that ‘Maubere...is part of FRETILIN political, cultural, semantic, and linguistic patrimony to identify the people and the nation of this country – from the outset, May 20 1974, when FRETILIN was founded’.

The ‘valorization of resistance’ clause also empowers the government to provide protection to veterans and dependents of those who struggled for independence (s11.3), and authorizes the republic to ‘render tribute’ to national heroes (s11.4). The Catholic Church also receives a special mention in the section, valorized by the State for its ‘participation...in the process of national liberation of East Timor’ (s11.2). This acknowledgment reflects the central role of the Church as a unifying forum for expressing the common suffering of various ethnic and language groups in East Timor. The Church’s decision to use Tetum rather than Indonesian in services also reinforced the its status as a lingua franca in parts of East Timor, facilitating its emergence as a distinctly ‘national’ language and expression of national identity.

As I have argued elsewhere, using the International Social Survey Programme module on National Identity to survey East Timorese tertiary student attitudes, the memory of the East Timorese resistance may be considered a ‘unifying’ official narrative of national history, as it is subject to a high degree of popular consensus. National Identity module questions about respondents’ levels of national pride suggest the relative strength of narratives of East Timorese history: history clearly emerges as the most ‘undisputed’ object of national pride in the sample. Table 1 shows the percentage responses to the question ‘how proud are you of East Timor in each of the following?”
By contrast, there is a widely-perceived disjunction between the ‘official’ cultural and linguistic affiliations of the East Timorese state, and those of much of the wider society. Specifically, there is an apparent and distinctive intergenerational rupture in an ‘official’ narrative emphasizing affiliations to Portuguese language and cultural heritage. Of particular interest are the constitutional sections relating to international relations and language. Section 8.3 provides that the Democratic Republic of East Timor ‘shall maintain privileged ties’ with the countries whose official language is Portuguese. The maintenance of a cultural affinity with Portugal is continued in the choice of the official language. Section 13 provides that Portuguese and Tetum, the lingua franca spoken by over eighty percent of East Timor’s population, will share official status.

Survey evidence suggests that this second constitutional theme may be considered a ‘disputed’ official narrative. For example, where eighty-three percent of tertiary student respondents described ‘ability to speak Tetum’ as ‘very important to being truly East Timorese’; the equivalent figure for Portuguese was twenty-four percent.27 Moreover, where certain national narratives are classically disputed between left and right, the axis of this conflict appears to be generational rather than ideological. This should come as little surprise, as Portuguese was an elite language during the colonial era, and little more than ten percent of East Timorese spoke it. The assimilated Portuguese-speakers (assimilados) formed a local elite, educated in seminaries and eligible for full Portuguese citizenship. This group was instrumental in the rise of Timorese nationalism in the 1960s and early 1970s. One of the complex legacies of Indonesian rule is evident in the fact that the Indonesian official language, Bahasa, is spoken by ninety percent of those under thirty-five, while the ten percent who speak Portuguese are mainly older people. Critically though, much of the political leadership of the country belongs to this Lusophone minority. Among other things, the partial rejection of certain ‘official’ narratives by young people highlights the difficult legacy of cultural division in the wake of consecutive colonial eras in East Timor. This legacy of post-independence

| Table 1. National Pride Responses (% of respondents; n = 320) |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
|                                | Very Proud | Proud | Not Very Proud | Not At All Proud | Don’t Know/No Response |
| The Way Democracy Works         | 51          | 28    | 17             | 2               | 2                   |
| Its Distinctive Culture         | 70          | 24    | 4              | 0               | 2                   |
| East Timor’s History            | 81          | 15.5  | 2              | 0.5             | 1                   |
| Its Fair and Equal Treatment    | 67.5        | 20.5  | 10             | 1.5             | 0.5                 |
| of All Groups in Society        |             |       |                |                 |                     |

**Portuguese Language and Cultural Heritage**

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division points to other challenges for the development of a national history curriculum.

**POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY**

One related issue concerns an intergenerational tension over what might constitute an authentic East Timorese historiography. In the dominant nationalist view, which emphasizes the long history of resistance against successive occupations, the Portuguese presence is critical to understanding East Timorese nationalism. A typical position is that expressed by Justinho Guterres, a senior education official, arguing that Portuguese colonialism makes East Timorese society different to West Timor.

...we are culturally diverse, yes, but politically we're united. First, by the influence of Christianity, brought by the Portuguese. And second, by Portuguese administrative authority, which somehow united us. They didn’t differentiate between Macassai or Tetum peoples, you are all Timorese. You are just not Portuguese. The third is independence. We had to resist, we had to fight, the occupying forces, the Indonesian forces. And that united us.28

For some among a younger generation of the resistance, there are different perspectives on an authentic Timorese nationalism. To a generation removed from Portuguese colonialism, and the ideologies of resistance that spread at the time of anti-colonial wars, a more ‘indigenous’ historiography – one which acknowledges an original and ongoing cultural unity with west Timor – holds appeal, offering, in their view, a truly post-colonial perspective on nationalism and struggle. One spokesperson of the youth independence movement Lian Maubere (‘Voice of the Maubere’) held that

East Timor has still not written its own history. Who is going to write the history? FRETILIN? CNRT? This is a worry. We believe we have to teach our history to our younger generation...What kind of history will they teach? Do we teach the history of East Timor itself? Of the people of East Timor? The local languages? Or of colonialism? I would prefer indigenous history, not related to colonialism. East Timor’s history itself; the local things.29

**POST-INDEPENDENCE TENSIONS**

While there is a high level of pride in East Timorese history, and broad popular endorsement of a central nationalist narrative of the 450-year
funu against foreign occupation, political and cultural tensions within the modern nationalist movement pose difficulties for writing the national history. Many of these are features common to postcolonial societies, and relate to the suppression of divisions within the independence movement in the period of nationalist struggle. For some Timorese, writing the national history is still too controversial a task, with the tensions over the divisive civil-war period, divisions within the independence movement, and the collaboration of segments of an occupied civilian population still too close at hand. As one Timorese educator put it, reconciliation between the parties to the civil war in 1975 – FRETILIN and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) – is incomplete, despite the formation of the united-front Council for the Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in 1986.

Where to start? It will be necessary to be diplomatic with Portugal and Indonesia. When it comes to the civil war in 1975, the parties still exist. And some of the Balibo parties – UDT, Apodeti, Kota, Trabalhista – I don’t know why you’d give them an opportunity as they brought East Timor to a terrible time. But this is part of democracy, so fine. It will be a controversial issue, very sensitive. So when you start talking history, you come to a sensitive issue.30

Others believe that civil-war tensions have subsided considerably, a long-term effect of the formation of the united-front CNRT under Xanana Gusmão’s leadership in 1986. Of more concern is an apparent tension between FRETILIN and former CNRT figures over the symbolic ‘ownership’ of the resistance, and its narrative of national liberation. Some political actors clearly feel that the importance of FRETILIN resistance in the late 1970s and early 1980s is being neglected in favour of a more unifying and politically-palatable emphasis on the subsequent CNRT ‘united-front’ years. As FRETILIN is now the governing party in East Timor, and former CNRT leader Xanana Gusmão the President, these symbolic tensions have added to existing perceptions of friction within the semi-Presidential system of government. These issues are very delicate, and all interviewees went off the record when addressing them. One FRETILIN MP put his view that

...there are a lot of people who have undertaken revisionism, they want to say that...history begins with Xanana Gusmão and the CNRT, and, you know, he’s one of our greatest heroes and I think what he did was fantastic, but East Timor’s history doesn’t begin with the formation of CNRT, East Timor’s modern struggle for independence history begins with that bloody period [after the invasion] in 1975.31
RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS

Relationships with Indonesia, Portugal and Australia are another issue to be considered in the light of post-independence politics. With Indonesia, this issue is starkly highlighted by tensions over the reconciliation process, and a realpolitik-inspired lack of will among some senior East Timorese politicians to pursue Indonesian military figures through UN human-rights processes. As one senior government figure put it in 2002, how East Timor will teach its history will remain a politically-controversial issue in relation to its neighbours.

...Whatever we say and do in terms of writing our history is going to affect our relationships with two of our major neighbours, Australia and Indonesia. I think Australia can accept open, free and frank debate. Indonesia, I don’t think is as easy a proposition as Australia. I had an interesting conversation with the former head of the Indonesian think-tank, and an editor of a major Indonesian newspaper, and their idea was that we would need to sit down and write our history together, that is that we would appoint two teams of people to sit down, plough through the documentation, and to have the dialogue and then to agree on a form of history...I think it’s a peculiarly Indonesian way of trying to do things. Sort of having an agreed outcome as to what our future history is.32

In early 2005, a joint Indonesia/East Timor ‘Truth and Friendship Commission’ (TFC) was established to ‘investigate the events of 1999’, sideling the recommendation by a UN panel of experts that a special international war-crimes tribunal be established if Indonesia failed to bring to justice those responsible for the post-referendum violence. The Catholic Church in East Timor have criticized the TFC as ‘an attempt to bury the past rather than pursue justice’.33 In December 2005, the long-awaited report of a separate national statutory authority investigating human rights violations in 1999, the Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR), was presented to Parliament. The East Timorese President, Xanana Gusmao, a key supporter of the bilateral TFC, criticized some of the CAVR report’s recommendations as ‘grandiose idealism’, and suggested that it was not in the national interest that the report be made public. Domestic critics accused the President of prioritizing foreign policy concerns over ongoing popular concerns for justice. For his part, the President has argued that the prosecution of Indonesian military figures would be counterproductive for the fledgling state, and that ‘the best justice, the true justice, was the recognition by the international community of the right to...independence’.34
NEO-COLONIAL LEGACIES

One final issue might be described as a lack of confidence and competence in historical methodologies, compounded by complexity of internal division following twenty-five years of resistance under extremely difficult circumstances. Thus the view is commonly heard that ‘we can’t write our own history because everyone disagrees’. In addition, there is a view among older Portuguese-educated Timorese that some younger people educated in the Indonesian system during the occupation became used to understanding history as one official story. For them, the frequently-heard notion that ‘different perspectives are a bad thing’ demonstrates a lingering influence of an authoritarian ‘New Order’ epistemology.

For many people I have interviewed, history is simply ‘too hot to handle’. There is a related and influential view that history should not be written by the East Timorese actors themselves, as the outcomes will be ‘biased’. Some feel the solution is for people from outside to collect the information, to try to be objective and diplomatic and bring the two sides to a ‘middle ground’. While there may indeed be a supporting role for external curriculum developers, this view highlights a broad lack of confidence in writing national history. As one teacher put it ‘for me, this is not the right time to write history, maybe leave it for another twenty years. This is one of reasons the history curriculum has not been done, it’s too controversial’. Similarly, an Indonesian historian, writing in 2000, recommended that newer Indonesian curricular perspectives on the history of East Timor’s temporary integration be commenced in 2005, in a ‘less heated atmosphere’.35

CONCLUSION

A range of serious challenges beset the task of history-curriculum development in East Timor. Nonetheless, there are useful contemporary models to be draw upon, such as that of Vanuatu, in which external curriculum developers collaborated closely with local historians. East Timor is a case which might also benefit from the ‘negotiated history’ methodology proposed by Barkan.36 While the nationalist concept of a 450-year resistance to colonial occupation has broad support in East Timorese society, beneath this apparent unity lies a more complex postcolonial struggle over core historical narratives, actors and identities. This perhaps will prove a greater challenge for history-curriculum developers than the more obvious question of resources.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES


5 Matsuno cited in Gunn, Timor Loro Sae, p. 290.

6 Gunn, Timor Loro Sae, p. 22.

7 Author’s survey of East Timorese history teachers, 2005.

8 See for example Abilio de Araujo, Timor Leste: Os Loricos Voltaram a Cantar: Das Guerras Independentistas a Revolucao do Povo Malhore, Lisbon, 1977. Gunn notes that Araujo’s periodization was one which refutes ‘Portuguese (although not necessarily Indonesian) historiography’, Timor Loro Sae, p. 11.

9 These Melanesian affinities were politically expressed through solidarity with West Papua and an oft-repeated desire to join South Pacific Forum rather than the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) upon independence. This position was in part attributable to the active support of Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Walter Lini, the only member of the non-aligned group of nations to support East Timor’s struggle for independence. Jose Ramos-Horta argued in 1999 that East Timor had ‘more in common culturally and historically with the South Pacific than with Indonesia and the rest of South-East Asia’ while geographically part of the latter region. See ‘East Timor: Observer status to be sought at Forum’, Pasifik Nius, 6 March 1999, http://www.etan.org/et99/march/1-7/01east.htm.


11 Gunn, Timor Loro Sae, p. 23. Funu, meaning warfare in Tetum, also refers to ritualized combat between tribal groups. Its meaning has subsequently been appropriated as a term to describe resistance to external occupation. For Gunn, it is important to distinguish between authentically proto-national rebellions, and the ritualized forms of funu, which took on anti-colonial, anti-tax dimensions: he argues (p. 281) that ‘it is only through an understanding of the ritualized aspects of funu that the near half millennium of Timorese resistance makes sense’.


16 At the time of writing, a Primary Curriculum Implementation Plan (2004–9) had just been released, approving a curriculum outline for grades 1–6. There is currently no formal middle and upper secondary-school history curriculum (aside from a poorly-distributed ‘emergency’ curriculum outline for middle level), nor a dedicated East Timorese history course at the National University. The exception is Marist Brothers Teacher Training Institute in Baucau, which runs a dedicated unit on the History of Timor-Leste.

17 Key ‘events’ in the Timor component of the curriculum included the ‘Balibo declaration’ by six leaders of anti-FRETILIN political parties in November 1975; the subsequent call for integration by the Indonesian-installed ‘East Timor People’s Representative Council’ in May 1976, and the formal act of integration signed by President Suharto on 17 July 1976.

18 Interview, 16 Nov. 2004.


22 Leach, ‘Valorising the Resistance’, p. 43.

23 Jill Joliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, St Lucia, 1978, pp. 103–5. The political significance of the term was evident in the 1998 decision to rename the National Council for Maubere Resistance as the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) – a concession to the UDT which considered the term a leftist one connoting class struggle.


25 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

26 Leach, ‘Privileged Ties’, p. 149.

27 See Leach, ‘Privileged Ties’, p.145. Despite the controversy over Portuguese language, other aspects of Portuguese cultural heritage are subject to a high degree of consensus. In particular, ‘being Catholic’ was rated as a ‘very important’ part of being ‘truly’ East Timorese by eighty-three percent of respondents.


30 Interview, 16 Nov. 2004. A related issue is the popular resentment occasionally expressed against some political leaders ‘taking over’ post-independence politics after having been in the diaspora during the Indonesian occupation.

31 Interview, 14 Aug. 2002.


35 ‘JKTP – Other side of RI’s History’.